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4a. Optimality Theory (OT), mentioned in the target article as a
promising direction, contains the strongest architectural and
specific universals currently available within generative
grammar. According to OT’s architectural universals (Prince &
Smolensky 1993/2004; 1997), grammatical computation is
optimization over a set of ranked constraints. This strong hypoth-
esis (more than the hypothesis of “parameters”) has contributed
insight into all levels of grammatical structure from phonology to
pragmatics, and has addressed acquisition, processing, and prob-
abilistic variation (the website http://roa.rutgers.edu hosts more
than 1,000 OT papers). In a particular OT theory, specific univer-
sals take the form of a set of constraints (e.g., C1 ¼ “a sentence
requires a subject”; C2 ¼ “each word must have an interpret-
ation,” etc.) A grammar for a particular language is then a priority
ranking of these constraints. For instance, C1 is ranked higher
than C2 in the English grammar, so we say “it is raining,”
although expletive “it” contributes nothing to the meaning; in
Italian, the reverse priority relation holds, making the subjectless
sentence “piove” optimal – grammatical (Grimshaw & Samek-
Lodovici 1998).
4b. OT’s cog-universals yield theories of cross-linguistic
typology that generally predict the absence of des-
universals. Each ranking of a constraint set mechanically pre-
dicts the possible existence of a human language. OT therefore
provides theories of linguistic typology that aim, as rightly
urged by the target article, to grapple with the full spectrum of
cross-linguistic variation. OT makes use of a large set of specific
universals (i.e., constraints), but because of the resolution of con-
straint conflict through optimization, these do not translate into
des-universals: In the preceding example, C1 is violated in
Italian, and C2 in English. Some des-universals can, however,
emerge as general properties of the entire typology, and can be
falsified by the data (as, perhaps, the existence of onsetless
languages). This does not entail abandoning the Generative Lin-
guistics program, nor the OT framework, but rather, revising the
theory with an improved set of specific universals.
5. Language is more a biological trait than a cultural
construct. The authors do not provide criteria to determine
where language is located on the continuum of bio-cultural
hybrids. Lenneberg, quoted in the target article, presented four
criteria for distinguishing biological traits from cultural phenom-
ena (universality across the species, across time, absence of learn-
ing of the trait, rigid developmental schedule) and concluded that
oral (but not written) language is a biological trait (Lenneberg
1964). The validity of this argument is ignored by the authors. Iro-
nically, OT is more readily connected to biology than to culture:
the archictural-universals of OT are emergent symbolic-level
effects of subsymbolic optimization over “soft” constraints in
neural networks (Smolensky & Legendre 2006); and Soderstrom
et al. (2006) have derived an explicit abstract genome that
encodes the growth of neural networks containing connections
implementing universal constraints.
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus on differences between
languages at a superficial level, rather than examining common processes.
Their emphasis on trivial details conceals uniform design features and
universally shared strategies. Lexical category distinctions between nouns
and verbs are probably universal. Non-local dependencies are a general
property of languages, not merely non-configurational languages. Even
the latter class exhibits constituency.
Languages exhibit hugely more diverse phenomena than are
displayed in well-studied European families. However, citing a
collection of exotica does not prove Evans & Levinson’s
(E&L’s) claim that “it’s a jungle out there” (sect. 3, para. 17).
Examining languages more closely, or at a higher level of abstrac-
tion, often reveals critical similarities which superficial descrip-
tions can obscure. Moreover, languages frequently employ
distinct grammatical strategies to achieve parallel outcomes;
thus, the universal is the end result, not the means of achieving
it. Finally, unrelated languages often “choose” the same strategy,
despite the lack of a single universal solution, suggesting that
homogeneity is widespread.
Lexical category distinctions (sect. 2.2.4). Certainly, there is
no invariant set of lexical or functional categories. But it
remains to be demonstrated that a language may lack any distinc-
tions between lexical categories, or, more specifically, may lack a
noun/verb distinction. E&L note that languages of the Pacific
Northwest Coast are frequently claimed to have no noun/verb
distinction, illustrating with Straits Salish. Similar claims have
been made for a nearby, unrelated family, Southern Wakashan
(e.g., Makah, Nuuchahnulth). Here, nouns can function as pre-
dicates (i.e., not only arguments) and bear predicative inflections,
including tense, aspectual, and person/number marking, and
verbs can function as arguments (i.e., not only predicates) and
bear nominal inflections, including determiners; (1) and (2)
give Nuuchahnulth examples from Swadesh (1939):
1. mamuuk-maa quu as- i
work-3s:INDIC man-the
“The man is working.”
2. quu as-maa mamuuk- i
man-3s:INDIC work-the
“The working one is a man.”
Thus, nominal and verbal roots cannot be identified either by
distribution or morphology. Additionally, essentially any lexical
root in Nuuchahnulth, including (the equivalents of) nouns,
adjectives, and quantifiers, can take verbal inflectional mor-
phology, superficially suggesting that all words are predicative,
and thus that there is no noun/verb distinction. Immediate evi-
dence against this (Braithwaite 2008) is that verbs only function
as arguments when a determiner is present, whereas nouns func-
tion as arguments even without a determiner.
Close inspection reveals further behavioral differences
between noun and verb roots (Braithwaite 2008). For instance,
proper names can take nominal inflections, such as the definite
- i, shown on noun and verb stems in (1) and (2), but cannot
take the third singular indicative verbal inflection -maa:
3. Jack-maa
Jack-3s:INDIC
(“He is Jack.”)
Names, a subclass of nouns, therefore cannot be predicates,
clearly distinguishing them from verb roots.
Moreover, although both nominal and verbal predicates can
bear possessive markers, nominal predicates with possessive
morphemes display a systematic ambiguity in terms of which
argument an accompanying person marker is understood to
refer to, whereas verbal predicates display no such ambiguity.
A similar ambiguity arises in tense marking. Verbal predicates
in Nuuchahnulth display a past tense suffix: -(m)it:
4. mamuuk-(m)it -(m)aÉ
work-PAST-1s.INDIC
“I was working.”
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This suffix also appears on nouns. Even nonpredicative nouns,
including names, can bear tense morphology, apparently sup-
porting the lack of a noun/verb distinction:
5. aÉ aa a qaÉsˇi – ’a mista-(m)it
and.then die-EVENTIVE Mista-PAST
“Then (the late) Mista died.”
The past-tense marker -(m)it on the name conveys the specific
meaning “former”; since names cannot be predicative in Nuu-
chahnulth, as (3) shows, this is evidently not a nominal predicate.
However, past-tense markers also attach to nominal predicates,
which are then interpreted in one of two ways: (6) shows a
past-tense nominal predicate, exactly parallel to (4), except with
a noun root; (7) displays a predicate nominal in which -(m)it
bears the alternative “former” meaning:
6. quu as-(m)it-(m)aÉ
person-PAST-1s.INDIC
“I was a man.”
7. uunuu ani uumiik-(m)it-qa
because that whaler-PAST-SUBORDINATE
“because he was a former whaler”
Critically, -(m)it on a verbal predicate never exhibits the
“former” meaning but is always interpreted simply as past
tense. In sum, careful investigation such as that of Braithwaite
provides ample evidence for a noun/verb distinction in Waka-
shan languages, despite superficial appearances.
Constituent structure (sect. 5). As E&L note, “non-configura-
tional” languages display free word order and discontinuous con-
stituents: in (8), from the Australian language Kalkatungu, the
underscore shows the components of the ergative subject, and
italics show the (nominative) object:
E&L state that “the parsing system for English cannot be
remotely like the one for such a language” (sect. 2, para. 3),
because case-tagging indicates relationships between words,
rather than constituency and fixed word order. But, in fact, the
parsing system for English is well used to non-local dependen-
cies – that is, to relating items not contiguous in the string.
Note the discontinuous constituents in the following examples,
and that the dependency even occurs across a clause boundary
in the second instance: A student sauntered in wearing a large
fedora; Which girl did you say he gave the books to __?.
Parsing in Kalkatungu (or Latin) therefore utilizes a strategy
also found in languages which do have clear constituents.
Moreover, completely unrelated non-configurational languages
like Kalkatungu and Latin share the same method of signal-
ing relationships between words (case-marking). All this
is hardly indicative of the jungle E&L assume; rather, it is
evidence that very few solutions are available, and that
languages make differential use of options from a small pool of
possibilities.
Furthermore, certain non-configurational Australian
languages (e.g., Wambaya; Nordlinger 2006) actually have one
strict word order requirement, namely that the auxiliary is in
second position, thus either second word, (9), or second constitu-
ent, (10) (Hale 1973 outlines the parallel requirement in
Warlpiri):
9. Nganki ngiy-a lurrgbanyi wardangarringa-ni alaji
this.ERG 3SF-PAST grab moon-ERG boy
“The moon grabbed (her) child.”
Crucially, the auxiliary cannot appear as, say, third word within
a four-word noun phrase. Contra E&L, this demonstrates the
psychological reality of word order and of constituent structure
in such languages. Moreover, while by no means universal,
second-position phenomena occur widely (e.g., Sanskrit, Celtic,
Germanic), demonstrating remarkable formal homogeneity
cross-linguistically.
Finally, E&L claim linguistic diversity is not characterized by
“selection from a finite set of types” (sect. 8, para 9, their thesis
3). Case-encoding systems are few indeed, and familiar strategies
(such as ergativity) even occur in language isolates such as
Basque.
Universal grammar is dead
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Abstract: The idea of a biologically evolved, universal grammar with
linguistic content is a myth, perpetuated by three spurious explanatory
strategies of generative linguists. To make progress in understanding
human linguistic competence, cognitive scientists must abandon the
idea of an innate universal grammar and instead try to build theories
that explain both linguistic universals and diversity and how they emerge.
Universal grammar is, and has been for some time, a completely
empty concept. Ask yourself: what exactly is in universal
grammar? Oh, you don’t know – but you are sure that the
experts (generative linguists) do. Wrong; they don’t. And not
only that, they have no method for finding out. If there is a
method, it would be looking carefully at all the world’s thousands
of languages to discern universals. But that is what linguistic typol-
ogists have been doing for the past several decades, and, as Evans
& Levinson (E&L) report, they find no universal grammar.
I am told that a number of supporters of universal grammar
will be writing commentaries on this article. Though I have not
seen them, here is what is certain. You will not be seeing argu-
ments of the following type: I have systematically looked at a
well-chosen sample of the world’s languages, and I have dis-
cerned the following universals . . . And you will not even be
seeing specific hypotheses about what we might find in universal
grammar if we followed such a procedure. What you will be
seeing are in-principle arguments about why there have to be
constraints, how there is a poverty of the stimulus, and other
arguments that are basically continuations of Chomsky’s original
attack on behaviorism; to wit, that the mind is not a blank slate
and language learning is not rat-like conditioning. Granted, beha-
viorism cannot account for language. But modern cognitive
scientists do not assume that the mind is a blank slate, and they
work with much more powerful, cognitively based forms of learn-
ing such as categorization, analogy, statistical learning, and inten-
tion-reading. The in-principle arguments against the sufficiency
of “learning” to account for language acquisition (without a uni-
versal grammar) assume a long-gone theoretical adversary.
Given all of the data that E&L cite, how could anyone maintain
the notion of a universal grammar with linguistic content? Tra-
ditionally, there have been three basic strategies. First, just as we
may force English grammar into the Procrustean bed of Latin
grammar – that is how I was taught the structure of English in
grade school – the grammars of the world’s so-called exotic
8. Tjipa-yi tjaa kunka-(ng)ku pukutjurrka lhayi nguyi-nyin-tu.
this-ERG this branch-ERG mouse kill fall-PARTICIPLE-ERG
“The falling branch hit the mouse.” (Blake 2001, p. 419)
10. Naniyawulu nagawulu baraj-bulu wurlu-n duwa.
that.DUAL.NOM female.DUAL.NOM old.person-DUAL.(NOM) 3.DUAL-PROG get.up
“Those two old women are getting up.”
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